Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy and What We Might Do About It
It might be tempting to overemphasize the new elements of U.S. foreign policy post-September 11, 2001, but there is a lot of continuity. In fact, it is probably more accurate to say that September 11 accelerated and reinforced preexisting characteristics and trends in U.S. foreign policy. I will just point to four continuities.
- First, increased military spending.
- Second, increased bullying of both enemies and allies and a drift away from multilateral institutions and international treaties.
- Third, U.S. military doctrine has gradually changed from deterrence to a more proactive policy. It has become one of maintaining and exercising omnipotence and control over uncertainty. Specifically, this is a shift in emphasis from containing to rolling back rogue states.
- Fourth, the United States has increasingly tended to define its interests very broadly. During the Clinton administration, the United States articulated an interest in promoting democracy – the national security strategy was “from containment to enlargement.” The current administration wants to promote its version of democracy, free markets, and morality. Economics is imbued with the moral certitude of the Victorian imperialists. For example, in the national security strategy (PDF) released in September 2002, the Bush administration argues that, “The concept of ‘free trade’ arose as a moral principle even before it became a pillar of economics.”1 Indeed, the national security strategy defines freedom in economic terms:If you can make something that others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something that you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom, the freedom for a person – or a nation – to make a living.2
- The White House, National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 17, 2002): 18, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (PDF). [↩]
- National Security Council, National Security Strategy, 18. [↩]