The Manhattan voyage led to urgent legislative action: the enactment of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, which was intended to demonstrate control, on paper at least. The preamble to the act states:
Parliament . . . recognizes and is determined to fulfil its obligation to see that the natural resources of the Canadian arctic are developed and exploited and the arctic waters adjacent to the mainland and islands of the Canadian arctic are navigated only in a manner that takes cognizance of Canada’s responsibility for the welfare of the Inuit and other inhabitants of the Canadian arctic and the preservation of the peculiar ecological balance that now exists in the water, ice and land areas of the Canadian arctic . . .
Fine words indeed, but statements of principle do not secure sovereignty.
Similarly, the Polar Sea episode in September 1985 led to an announcement by the then secretary of state for external affairs, Joe Clark, about measures to strengthen Canada’s claim to Arctic waters, specifically the drawing of baselines around the Arctic Archipelago to delineate Canadian internal and territorial waters. Clark also announced increased aerial surveillance and naval patrols, and spoke of Canada’s intention to build a class-eight polar icebreaker. In January 1988, Canada signed an agreement with the U.S. on Arctic cooperation.
The current iteration is the “use it or lose it” tour by Prime Minister Harper, which accompanied announcements of a deepwater port at Nanisivik and an army training base at Resolute Bay. What does Harper mean? Have Inuit not been using the region for millennia? Amid the latest round of promises, has Canada forgotten the northern governments and aboriginal institutions that have been negotiating and implementing arrangements for the better governance of the Arctic for the past thirty-five years? Harper seems genuine, but Canada’s interest must be sustained through comprehensive policy development, infrastructure development, and investment in the people of this region. We cannot continue to lurch from crisis to crisis.
Luckily for Canada, the Inuit are always here. Without the Inuit, could we really claim to be masters of the Arctic house? Probably not. Ultimately, the Arctic sovereignty issue will depend on people, not ports or training facilities or military exercises. If Canada is to secure a long-standing and unimpeachable claim to the Arctic, it must be grounded in the daily realities of the Inuit and other Canadians who make this region their home. Why does Canada seem to forget that we are there each time a crisis looms?
Canada’s mistreatment of the Inuit in using them as human flagpoles to assert sovereignty was laid out with excruciating honesty during hearings convened by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in the early 1990s. A settlement was finally achieved and a semi-apology delivered. How ironic now for Canada to brandish the fact that Canadian citizens—Inuit—live in the Arctic in order to add legitimacy to its sovereignty claims.
Inuit across the Arctic see the lack of action by Canada in fulfilling land claims agreements. In December 2006, for example, Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (NTI), which represents Nunavut Inuit in these matters, launched a lawsuit against the federal government for violating the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA). NTI is asking for $1 billion in damages. The organization’s president, Paul Kaludjak, explained that Canada was not living up to its responsibilities and that every attempt to negotiate a satisfactory implementation contract had been derailed:
“The Government of Canada keeps Inuit dependent and in a state of financial and emotional despair despite promises made when the NLCA was signed in 1993. The Government of Canada is not holding up its end of the bargain. Canada got everything it wanted immediately upon signing the NLCA. Inuit are still waiting for full implementation of the Agreement.”
In 2004, Thomas Berger, a former justice of BC’s Supreme Court, was brought in as a conciliator. After conducting a review, Berger concluded that Nunavut is in a state of crisis, and that Inuit will only get their fair share of jobs in government and elsewhere when the education and training systems are transformed. Will the recent Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement and the new Nunavik Land Claims Agreement live up to Berger’s recommendations, or will these accords suffer the same fate as the NLCA?
