Ann Burlein,
"The Molecular Body and the Christian Secular"
(page 5 of 7)
One might be tempted to dismiss the rhetoric surrounding the
impersonality of molecules as merely the usual 'faith' that the West
places in the scientific method. This
dismissal—while mistaken—involves a claim that is, I think, true: contemporary medical
technologies do require researchers, physicians, and consumers to
inhabit different relations toward the body than the modernist relations
of abnormality and pathology.[67]
Take a non-molecular example: the
very different way we regard surgeries which break the skin and
surgeries like video endoscopy (which insert a small video camera
attached to a television cable into the body). When the body is cut
open, its interiors are personal; it is shaming to see it and health
care professionals go to great lengths to ensure that patients do not
see their own insides. In the words of surgeon Richard Seltzer, when a
patient glimpses their own viscera in the surface of the operating lamp,
"I quickly bend over his opened body to shield it from his view ... I am no
longer a surgeon but a hierophant."[68]
In contrast, when there is no
(or minimal) cutting of skin, affective relations change. The patient
often watches the video screen along with the doctor. According to Jose
van Dijck, such surgeries are more routinely shown on European public
TV. These changes lead van Dijck to suggest that, "[t]he once-private
inner body" (produced through the strengthening of religio-moral
sensibilities regarding sexuality and shame) is being transformed "into
a public sight-seeing space" whose visibility via technology entails no
shame.[69]
If van Dijck is right, this is a huge change in how we inhabit
certain dimensions of our body. (I say 'certain' because the molecular
body over-layers the body of pathological anatomy; it does not simply
replace it). These changed dynamics are only amplified as medicine
targets molecules through a touch so small it becomes 'smart.' Molecular
medicine shifts away from relying on and producing affects like shame
and stigma in favor of inculcating an impersonal ethics of
stewardship/consumption in which we are incited to take up this
flattening of the body's truth by seeking to optimize its capacity for
capacity. Consider anthropologist Kaja Finkler's interviews with women
with breast cancer and adoptees. Finkler notes:
One might have anticipated a degree of fatalism among the
sick, but curiously the ideology becomes reinterpreted in such a way
that it moves people to act on the belief that to comprehend the reasons
for one's affliction is to prevent it .... In the case of adoptees, the very
consciousness of genetic inheritance moves them to act by searching for
their birth parents.[70]
Finkler expected her interviewees to express anger or blame at family
members or ancestors who might have transmitted breast cancer to them.
None did. Asserting that "they could not have known," these women were
more likely to see "the ideology of genetic inheritance [as] giv[ing]
meaning to the randomness inherent in genetics, to the 'luck of the
draw,' by supplying a reason for suffering and thereby making it more
bearable."[71]
The question remains, of course, regarding how this sense of
'meaningfulness' might change if technology develops sufficiently so
that family members 'could have known.' (Think of the blame heaped upon
older women who decline amniocentesis and then bear a child with Down
Syndrome). That said, no parent could test for every possible genetic
mis-coding—there are too many. In the molecular, differential
variation is the norm. In terms of the body's genetic sequences, none of
us are normal, no, not one. "Most, if not all, of us suffer from
molecular errors that are potentially
correctable."[72] Hence critics
worry that we might all see ourselves as inhabiting a 'spoiled' identity
that subjects us to lifelong medical supervision. Yet even this kind of
expansion of 'the sick role' would mean that medicine could no longer
inhabit the modernist horizon of pathology and normality in the same
way. Because genetics focuses not on deviant individuals but on
molecular anomalies that are found in each one of us (at least in
theory)[73],
Nikolas Rose argues that clinical medicine is developing
logics of variation without norm, anomaly without
abnormality.[74] Such
logics enable different expectations regarding the human body and its
truth, and thus make possible different formations of 'personhood.'
As Paul Rabinow has commented:
Fate it will be. It will carry no depth. It makes absolutely
no sense to seek the meaning of the lack of a guanine base because it
has no meaning. One's relation to one's father or mother is not shrouded
in the depths of discourse here; the relationship is material even if it
is environmental: Did your father smoke? Did your mother take DES? Rest
assured they didn't know what they were
doing.[75]
But don't rest for long. The point of knowing whether you carry genetic
mutations is less to understand them than to change them (if only by
intervening in their expression through avoiding lifestyle triggers).
While medicine is still centrally engaged in preaching sermons about
sexuality, its contemporary sermons call us to live the fate of familial
inheritance—an 'identity,' to use an older term—through the practice
of somatic individuality: "To be a 'somatic' individual, in this sense,
is to code one's hopes and fears in terms of this biomedical body, and
to try to reform, cure or improve oneself by acting on that
body."[76]
Molecular medicine accelerates the scientific rejection of illness as
punishment for sin in favor of seeing sickness as a disease which one is
not at fault for having—but which (unlike tuberculosis in the
nineteenth century) is not to be embraced as the lyrical source of one's
individuality either.[77]
In the molecular body, even a fatal logic is
not a fatalism.[78]
The force of molecular twists of fate is not
backward looking but forward pulling. Echoing the revolutionary language
that animated the clinic's birth and extending arguments from the 1950s,
today's genetics offers itself as a way to end social oppression and
biological determinism. While individuals are still called to take up
particular identities in the present, these 'identities' are 'taken on'
as risk factors.[79]
Somatic "[i]ndividuals seek to anticipate and shape
'nature' before it actually comes to pass, based on the risk that what
is presently a non-event might actually
occur ...."[80] Identities serve
here as differential technologies by which to shift a fate that, as
somatic, is not personal. In Foucauldian terms, the 'impersonality' of
molecules works less through perverse implantation via notions of
instinct obscurely rooted in some secret past, and more through inciting
individuals to pre-empt possible futures. In a way that can at first
seem quite paradoxical, fate has become more determining—but
therefore also, fate has become more open to human acts of pre-emptive
selection that seek to erase certain kinds of somatic risk while
maximizing others.
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