Lisa Lowe, "The Gender of Sovereignty" (page 3 of 7)

Newly independent nations emerging from decolonization entered a world system in which the nation-state was the normative unit of sovereignty recognized by the postwar world. Yet after the establishment of the state, the new national governments—often provisional, not yet "legitimate"—created new societies with difficulty; there were internal and external obstacles to the redistribution of sovereignty, land, and economic power necessary for actual "decolonization."[14] The period of newly emerging independent nations converged with U.S. postwar economic interests in expansion and investment abroad; U.S. "development" projects often created new dependency or reproduced old inequality for the new nations.[15] In this sense, while scholars and statesmen have tended to cast postcolonial nationhood as the vehicle for third world "progress" and entry into the modern world of nations, statehood for the formerly colonized has rarely meant actual autonomy and self-determination.[16] New postcolonial states have remained disadvantaged in the uneven distribution of both sovereignty and resources, and it is evident that what Francis Fukuyama called "the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" has hardly taken place.[17] The United Nations, founded in 1945 when many former colonial areas were becoming independent states, has been the central institution in the conduct of international relations; yet however much the U.N. attempts to represent the larger community of nations, it has tended to be the circle of victors emerging from World War II who have held sway. The U.N. Charter framed abstract principles for international cooperation: sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of states, non-intervention in internal affairs, equal rights—yet the Charter is not a constitution for international society, and it has no central authority to legislate nor does it possess the character of a government.[18] Multilateral organizations within the U.N., such as the Non-Aligned Movement in 1965, sought to address the disparity of power between states, representing those not aligned with or against the major superpowers.[19] International non-governmental organizations, or INGOs, have sponsored forceful multilateral initiatives in the areas of human rights, war crimes, world health and environmental protection.[20] Yet comparative politics and international relations have only begun to explore the range of extra-state issues that accompany globalization, such as the politics of immigration or the growth of non-governmental organizations.

Two particular "schools" for understanding international politics have presumed the ideal type of the nation-state. The "realist" school (sometimes called "neorealist" to indicate both its affinity with and distinction from earlier approaches) conceives the state as a sovereign, monolithic unit with little internal differentiation whose primary purpose is to defend the national interest; neorealists generally see, as did Thomas Hobbes, the conflicts among nations as necessarily aggressive, perpetual struggles for security and power.[21] What Hans Morgenthau called "political realism" gained particular vigor after World War II and during the Cold War, when the U.S. was engaged in a power struggle with the Soviet Union. Realism deployed the language of power and interests rather than of ideals and norms; it encompassed the propositions that states are the major actors in world affairs, that international anarchy is the principle force shaping states, that states in anarchy are predisposed toward conflict and competition, and that international institutions will only marginally affect the prospects for cooperation.[22] "The state among states... conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war," Kenneth Waltz wrote in 1979.[23]

The "liberal institutionalist" or "neoliberal" school challenged the realist assumption of anarchy and its utilitarian "state as actor" approach, and argued for international institutions of cooperation. If the "realist" tradition follows a particular understanding of Thomas Hobbes, the "liberal" one emerges out of the political theory of John Locke, and became embodied by Woodrow Wilson, John Dewey, and Franklin Roosevelt.[24] The "neoliberal" approach emphasized its distinction from "liberalism" by integrating realism's concern with interests and power. It argues that increased global interconnection has transformed earlier meanings of state sovereignty and autonomy, and that international relations depend upon what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye called "complex interdependence," or multiple channels and institutions of common interest and collaboration.[25] Neoliberals envision a global society that functions alongside individual states by means of regional treaties or hemispheric economic trade agreements, to institutions such as the United Nations, and to increasing numbers of international non-governmental organizations addressing issues from environmental protection to human rights to nuclear deterrence. This latter "institutionalist" approach had come to represent the mainstream analysis in the political science of international relations, in the two decades after the Cold War.[26] Since September 2001, however, the U.S. has pursued what could be termed not simply a "neorealist," but a "neoconservative" foreign policy that harks back to the political realist approach of the Cold War period. Indeed, neoconservatives argued that the U.S. should never have reduced their military power after the Cold War, and the aggressive unilateral stance in Iraq was the only way for the U.S. to recuperate its global stature.[27] Neoconservatives believe that U.S. nationalism should be vigorously institutionalized in both public and private institutions, such as in schooling and the family; they are antagonistic to international institutions, believing they undermine the authority of the U.S. state. This approach, exemplified by the "Bush Doctrine" of pre-emptive war, constitutes a radical departure from earlier U.S. foreign policy, effectively abandoning the Cold War doctrine of deterrence or even the post-Cold War notions of multipolar collaboration.[28]

Where neorealists study factors in the individual nation-state to observe actions of states to defend themselves, neoliberals study diplomatic treaties, international institutions, trade and development policies that represent common interests and cooperation. Neorealists see war as necessary in a world in which every state seeks to dominate others.[29] Neoliberals, on the other hand, contend that complex systems of "international regimes"—the norms, rules, regulations, decision-making procedures, and institutions that accompany global economic interdependence—have greatly diminished the necessity of military force; international regimes do not replace reciprocity and agreement, but work to stabilize, reinforce, and institutionalize it.[30]

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